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# USSTRATCOM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS



## INTERIM UPDATE ON READINESS OF THE 91 MISSILE WING 23-27 SEPTEMBER 2013

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**(U) EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Bottom line, as an interim update to the Commander USSTRATCOM on the readiness of the 91 Missile Wing (MW), a USSTRATCOM team led by Brigadier General Fred Stoss visited the 91 MW on 22-27 September 2013. The team determined that the 91 MW conducts ICBM operations, maintenance, and security in a manner that is safe, secure and effective. Leadership across the wing is engaged and effective. The Operations Group has made significant progress in correcting the issues stemming from the recent Consolidated Unit Inspection (CUI). Maintenance technical operations were error-free. Security Forces and supporting elements performed exceptionally well during two delay/deny/recapture exercises. In summary, the 91 MW capably executes its day-to-day mission and is on a glide slope for a satisfactory result with their pending Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI).

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 4-13 March 2013, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) conducted a CUI of the 91 MW. The overall CUI rating for the 91 MW was "SATISFACTORY" with 23 separately graded items. One item, ICBM Operations, was graded as "marginal," all others were "satisfactory" or better. Two areas of concern primarily led to the "marginal" grade in ICBM Operations--sub-standard missile crew performance during simulator evaluation scenarios and in Emergency War Order (EWO) testing. Subsequently, root cause analysis and associated countermeasures were developed and implemented for these areas.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 4-7 September 2013, HQ 20 AF conducted an Operations Assessment to validate the corrective actions focusing on the two areas of concern stemming from the CUI. During this assessment, missile crews performed well, with 11 of 12 crews passing evaluations in the simulator, and 72 of 75 crew members passing a no-notice EWO test. Both the evaluations and the tests were written and administered by Higher Headquarters and not the local unit.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 22-30 September 2013, AFGSC conducted a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) to assist the 91 MW on a non-attribution basis. The HQ AFGSC team (that included HQ 20 AF personnel) was professional, thorough and had considerable subject-matter expertise. Four USSTRATCOM observers were present on 22-27 September 2013 to provide an interim update to Commander USSTRATCOM on the readiness of the 91 MW.

**(U) BACKGROUND:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 4-13 March 2013, AFGSC conducted a CUI on the 91 MW. The CUI is an AFGSC initiative that combines several inspections to reduce the overall inspection footprint, allowing units more time to train and to accomplish the mission. The overall CUI rating for the 91 MW was "SATISFACTORY" (on a 5-tier scale) with 23 separately graded items.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Of the 23 items, one item, ICBM Operations, was rated "marginal"--all others were graded "satisfactory" or better. Sub-standard performance in the 91 Operations Group, specifically, in the Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT) and with Emergency War Order (EWO) testing, were the core factors for the "marginal" grade in ICBM Operations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Figure 1 illustrates the cycle immediately prior to implementing the CUI initiative, named Combat Capability Evaluations (CCEs). A relative gap in performance between the 91

MW and other wings is indicated in the CCE inspection cycle prior to the most recent 91 MW CUI. Figure 1 also compares the most recent 91 MW CUI performance to the other missile wings.


	MPT			EWO pass rate (Pass/Group; Test Avg)
<b>Historical comparative analysis</b>				
<b>91 MW – CCE (26 Apr–7 May 2010)</b>	<u>HQ</u> 8	<u>Q</u> 3	<u>UQ</u> 2	<b>91%</b> <b>(52/57; 95%)</b>
<b>90 MW – CCE (7-16 Feb 2011)</b>	<u>HQ</u> 14	<u>Q</u> 1	<u>UQ</u> 1	<b>98%</b> <b>(55/56; 97%)</b>
<b>341 MW – CCE (21-30 Mar 2011)</b>	<u>HQ</u> 14	<u>Q</u> 2	<u>UQ</u> 0	<b>96%</b> <b>(54/56; 97%)</b>
	<u>Q1</u> 3	—	—	<b>N/A</b>
	<u>Q1</u> 9	<u>Q2</u> 1	<u>Q3</u> 1	<b>94%</b> <b>(33/35; 96%)</b>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Note: The lack of data for the 90 MW CUI was due to minimal MPT testing and no EWO testing. The CUI inspection system was adjusted to include additional MPT testing and EWO testing in subsequent inspections.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Figure 1:** Historical CCE Performance from 2010-11 Cycle and Recent CUI Performance from 2012-13 Cycle.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Furthermore, when analyzing inspection data more broadly and looking specifically at NSIs as well as Limited NSIs (LNSIs) and Defense NSIs (DNSIs), the 91 MW's performance in other higher headquarters inspections is unremarkable in comparison to the other two MWs (see Figure 2 on the next page).

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(U//~~FOUO~~) **Figure 2:** DNSI, NSI and LNSI Inspection Results (Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory) for the Missile Wings, 2008-2013.

(U) **ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following the 91 MW's 2013 CUI, AFGSC initiated a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) effort led by HQ AFGSC, including additional personnel from HQ USSTRATCOM, HQ 20 AF and the 91 MW. The team determined the root causes of the issues discovered in ICBM Operations during the 2013 CUI and also proposed countermeasures. On 5 August 2013, Lieutenant General Kowalski, the Commander of AFGSC, presented the briefing to General Kehler, Commander USSTRATCOM. Four root causes were identified as well as associated counter-measures:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Inadequate Training:** Training products and tools were not properly utilized. Countermeasures included improving EWO self-study, instructor utilization, and incorporate nuclear surety and lessons learned.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Measurement tools not properly implemented:** The number of no-notice evaluations was insufficient and exams were not proctored. Countermeasures included proctoring exams, meeting requirements for no-notice evaluations, giving T-1 tests one month after training and 20 AF providing standardized exams on a quarterly basis.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Lack of leadership:** A culture of accountability was not fostered by operations group senior leadership. Countermeasures included establishing a professional development program, senior leader mentorship and encouraging constructive feedback.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Insufficient leadership (e.g. Field Grade Officer) manning:** Key mid-level leadership billets were left unmanned. Countermeasures included filling gapped billets, meeting combat requirements effectively, and utilizing Weapons Officers appropriately.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The effectiveness of the implemented countermeasures was subsequently validated via the HQ 20 AF Operational Assessment and the HQ AFGSC NSSAV.

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**(U) VALIDATION OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) HQ 20 AF Operational Assessment. On 4-7 September 2013, HQ 20 AF conducted an Operations Assessment focusing on 91 MW CUI areas of concern--performance issues in MPT scenarios and EWO testing. 20 AF observed 12 Missile Combat Crews in MPT scenarios resulting in all scoring Qualification Level 1 (Q1) or higher, with the exception of one Qualification Level 3 (Q3) rating. Seventy-five crew members received a EWO test yielding a 95.6% average and a 96% pass rate.

(U//~~FOUO~~) AFGSC NSSAV. On 23-30 September 2013, HQ AFGSC (with augmentation by HQ 20 AF) conducted a NSSAV to assist 91 MW on a non-attribution basis. The NSSAV focused on six mission areas: operations, PRP, maintenance, nuclear surety, nuclear security and nuclear certified equipment management. The AFGSC staff identified 23 strengths, 45 observations and 16 recommended improvement areas and the visit culminated with a comprehensive report provided to the 91 MW/CC.

(U//~~FOUO~~) USSTRATCOM Interim Update. On 23-27 September 2013, HQ USSTRATCOM conducted an independent interim update on the readiness of the 91 MW. Details are provided immediately below.

**(U) USSTRATCOM Interim Update:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Bottom line, as an interim update to the Commander USSTRATCOM on readiness of the 91 MW, a USSTRATCOM team led by Brigadier General Fred Stoss determined the 91 MW conducts ICBM operations, maintenance, and security in a manner that is safe, secure and effective. Leadership across the wing is engaged and effective. The Operations Group has made significant progress in correcting the issues stemming from the recent CUI. Maintenance technical operations were error-free. Security Forces and supporting elements performed exceptionally well during two deny/delay/recapture exercises. In summary, the 91 MW capably executes its day-to-day mission and is on a glide slope for a satisfactory result with their pending NSI.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This interim assessment is based on the HQ AFGSC and HQ 20 AF visits/reports provided to USSTRATCOM, as well as observations by the USSTRATCOM team of select events during the NSSAV.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The HQ AFGSC team (that included HQ 20 AF personnel) was professional and thorough, and had considerable subject-matter expertise. Their assistance, observations and recommendations will further improve the wing. With that said, an NSSAV cannot look at every activity, task and/or team to ensure success for an upcoming NSI. The 91 MW must continue to be self-critical and find issues and problems, and then properly implement enduring corrective actions and validation measures.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Operations:** Overall, the 91 OG demonstrated significant improvement post-CUI and performed well. Targeting assignments and coding were verified as correct with minor administrative discrepancies noted.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) MPT. Twelve NSI-type scenarios were presented to missile combat crews with three minor errors. The scenarios presented in the MPT tested security, weapon system safety rules, weapon system, and EWO knowledge. Missile combat crews demonstrated strong performances during the NSI-style MPT scenarios.

(U//~~FOUO~~) EWO Testing. The AFGSC NSSAV did not administer EWO testing. However, during the HQ 20 AF Operations Assessment, a significant number of crew members were tested (75 in total) and posted a 96% pass rate and an overall test score average of 95.6%. HQ USSTRATCOM and HQ AFGSC observed one EWO classroom training session. The training was thorough and the test was properly proctored.

	MPT			EWO pass rate (pass/group; test avg)
<b>91 MW – CUI (4-13 Mar 2013)</b>				
<b>Assessments after corrective measures</b>				
<b>91 MW – 20AF Operations Assessment (4-7 Sep 2013)</b>	<u>Q1</u> 11	<u>Q2</u> --	<u>Q3</u> 1	<b>96%</b> <b>(72/75; 95.6%)</b>
<b>91 MW – AFGSC NSSAV (22-30 Sep 2013)</b>	<u>Q1</u> 12	<u>Q2</u> --	<u>Q3</u> --	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Cumulative</b>	<u>Q1</u> 23	<u>Q2</u> --	<u>Q3</u> 1	96% (72/75; 95.6%)

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Figure 3:** Comparison of MPT/EWO Performance of HQ 20 AF Operations Assessment & HQ AFGSC NSSAV to CUI.

(C) Launch Control Center (LCC) Observations. AFGSC visited all 15 LCCs within a two-day period. Overall performance was solid. (b)(1) 1.4(a) USSC

(U//~~FOUO~~) Targeting. A complete targeting audit was accomplished by the 625 STOS/OSK personnel--all targeting was accurate with minor administrative issues.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Codes. All LF and LCC configuration records were reviewed with no discrepancies. Code controller and handler records were reviewed with minor administrative corrections.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Maintenance: Overall, the 91 MXG demonstrated the ability to execute maintenance actions with proficiency. AFGSC observed a variety of technical operations.

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nuclear certified equipment management, payload-transporter maintenance/support equipment with only minor observations noted.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Technical Operations. AFGSC observed several technical operations with zero observations, to include tape-load start up, code-change verifier tasks, re-entry system mating and a NS50 MGS certification. Job knowledge, adherence to technical data, concern for safety as well as proper control of code components was noteworthy. The maintenance team chiefs were engaged, maintained control of the evolution and demonstrated expert knowledge.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Nuclear Certified Equipment. One hundred-forty five pieces of handling gear were inspected with minor discrepancies corrected on the spot.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment. Most tools, test, tie-down and handling equipment were inspected as well as four Payload Transporter trailers and five tractors with minor observations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Security: Overall, the 91 MW demonstrated a strong capability to protect, and if necessary, deny, delay and recapture critical assets. Defenders were motivated and performed well as a whole. More focus is warranted with procedural standardization for entry procedures, weapons storage/configuration/issue, and accomplishment of Air Force Instruction-mandated tasks for Security Forces.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Deny/Delay/Recapture Exercises. The results of the launch facility, convoy, and flight exercises indicate a ready security posture/force, to include the 54 Helicopter Squadron, Tactical and Convoy Response Flights, and in field security forces. A responsive and well-orchestrated response by the 91 MW demonstrated that they are capable and willing to provide a safe and secure missile complex.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Missile Security Control and the Keys and Codes Control Center met all critical standards and accomplished their duties with precision and discipline.

(U) Other:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). The PRP across the wing, to include the important interaction with the 5 Bomb Wing, is effective. The AFGSC team reviewed 112 medical records with only minor discrepancies. In addition, 152 individual personnel folders and all Unfavorable Information Files were reviewed without any significant PRP concerns. The AFGSC team also interviewed ten Certifying Officials and fourteen Program Managers with no discrepancies or concerns.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Nuclear Surety Program. A total of 417 personnel were tested with one failure and an overall wing average of 93.6%.

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